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Democracy and Judicial Review in the
European Community
Anne-Marie Burleyf

The rumblings about the "democracy deficit" in the European
Community have grown steadily louder. 'Once only a catch-phrase
for journalists, concern about the lack of accountability on the part
of Community decisionmaking bodies has grown steadily with their
continuing accretion of power. In brief, as the Community comes
to look more like a "government," exercising genuine governmental
power over the "citizens of the Union," 1 those citizens wonder why
the Community should not be subject to the same popular restraints imposed on their local, regional, and national
governments.2
Rising concern about the democracy deficit has generated a
range of responses, calling for both legal and political change. The
most common response emphasizes the need to alter the formal
legal structure of the Community. In a Community with superficial
equivalents to a national executive, legislature, and judiciary, enhanced "democracy" has, not surprisingly, tended to focus attention on enhancing the power of the European Parliament.' As the
seat of the elected representatives of Community citizens, the logic

t Assistant Professor of Law and Russell Baker Scholar, University of Chicago Law
School.
Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty"), Art G, 31 ILM 247 (Feb 7, 1992)
(inserting a new Article 8 in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community).
' Roland Bieber states the issue with characteristic clarity: "Although formally separated from the institutions and the legal order of the Member States, the authority in whose
name power is exercised by the Community, i.e., the 'peoples of the States brought together
in the Community,' is identical. Therefore the form of government commonly to be found in
the States necessarily has to find a structural equivalent on the Community level." Roland
Bieber, Democratization of the European Community through the European Parliament,
46 Aussenwirtschaft 391, 393 (1991). Bieber notes that the European Parliament itself has
passed a resolution concerning the "democratic deficit" and cites to various positions in the
literature on existence and significance of such a deficit. Id at 394 nn 1-3.
' See, for example, Siegfried Magiera, Die Haushaltsbefugnisse des Europdischen
Parlaments- Ansatz zur parlamentarischen Mitregierung auf Gemeinschaftsebene?, in
Festschrift fir Hans Jrgen Schlochauer 829 (Walter de Gruyter, 1981); Gottfried Zieger,
Die Stellung des Europdischen Parlamentes,in Festschrift far Hans Jrgen Schlochauer
947; and Koen Lenaerts, Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European
Community, 28 Common Mkt L Rev 11, 20 (1991).
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runs, strengthening the Parliament's voice in the Community legislative process will strengthen the voice of the people. This reasoning has informed efforts to increase Parliamentary power in the
recently concluded Maastricht Treaty, efforts that were only partially successful. Assuming that the Maastricht Treaty is ratified,
the European Parliament will have achieved the status of a "codecisionmaker" with the European Council and the Commission in
a specified number of issue areas, but the Parliament will remain
in a consultative or "co-operative" role in many other important
4
areas.
A more subtle response to the democracy deficit is both more
theoretical, drawing on the fundamentals of democratic theory,
and more pragmatic and political, willing to confront the roots of
private-spirited opposition to the Community. The argument
starts from a different diagnosis of the underlying problem. Joseph
Weiler argues convincingly that majority voting diminishes the
control of individual national Parliaments over the integration process, thereby subjecting the citizens of Member States to decisions
favoring a majority coalition of other Member States.5 Even granting the European Parliament full decisionmaking powers will not
solve this problem, but rather will dramatize the territorial expansion of the polity.' Why should Danes who are willing to accept
majority decisions by other Danes automatically be willing to accept majority decisions by Spaniards, Greeks, Dutch, and
Germans? 7 In this context, Weiler points out that De Gaulle's
"Luxembourg Compromise," the informal agreement that prevented majority voting whenever a Member State felt a "vital interest" to be at stake, effectively secured the legitimacy of the
Community." De Gaulle's solution reassured each individual national parliament that it had a veto on the Community decisionmaking process.9 Conversely, the best response to the democracy
deficit is to slow and safeguard the integration process sufficiently
to permit the gradual construction of a genuine European "polity,"

For a brief overview of Maastricht Treaty provisions concerning the Parliament, see
Juliet Lodge, After Maastricht: Maastricht and Political Union, 1 European Access 7
(1992).
' Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L J 2403, 2466-74
(1991).
' This response overlaps the call for enhanced Parliamentary power, supporting it but
suggesting the need to go farther.
Weiler, 100 Yale L J at 2466-74 (cited in note 5).
"Id at 2473.
9 Id.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

defined as a territorial entity within which minorities will accept-as legitimate-decisions by majorities.
These two versions of the democracy deficit advance political
solutions to a political problem. Yet it is also possible to imagine a
judicial response to the democracy deficit. Although it may seem
counter-intuitive to call on the one non-elected branch of the liberal democratic governmental trio as a protector or enhancer of democracy, American liberal theorists, fusing the insights of Montesquieu and Madison, have long focused on the critical importance of
the courts to a well-functioning democracy. In this brief introduction, I will sketch three possible avenues of judicial contribution to
the stabilization and improvement of democratic self-governance
in the European Community, drawing directly on ideas suggested
by several of the articles that follow and more speculatively on my
own ideas as inspired by the work of several of the contributors to
this Symposium.
I.

ENHANCING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Sir Francis Jacobs predicted in his keynote address that the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") of the 1990s would focus more
on action by Community organs than by the Member States. Arguing that the ECJ has fulfilled its main function of creating a Community legal system by enforcing Community laws and principles
against Member States, he concluded that it would now emphasize
checks and balances among Community organs to prevent abuses
of power. Within this framework, several judicial modes of
strengthening democratic accountability present themselves. The
first and most direct mode is by making a special effort to protect
and bolster the European Parliament in the exercise of both its

traditional powers and its new rights and responsibilities under the
Maastricht Treaty. If the cure for the Community's democratic ills
is indeed increased Parliamentary participation in Community
decisionmaking, then the ECJ can help by securing those powers
until the Parliament finds its feet.
A second way in which the ECJ can enhance democracy, or at
least the appearance of democracy, at the Community level is to
insist on a very high degree of democratic accountability by other
non-elected decisionmakers-the Community bureaucracy. Drawing on a wealth of examples from the history of judicial supervision
of administrative agencies in the United States, Martin Shapiro focuses on the seemingly innocuous "giving reasons requirement"
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embedded in Article 190 of the EEC Treaty.1" The U.S. analogue
of this requirement has mutated from a simple procedural check
ensuring that government officials could give reasons for their decisions (thereby vindicating the fundamental precept of democratic
government that authority be exercised on the basis of reason
rather than individual caprice) to a requirement both of transparency and of "dialogue" with affected interest groups. This trajectory has been guided by traditional liberal democratic principles
of governmental accountability and by the pluralist emphasis on
ensuring maximum interest group participation in the political
process.11 Thus far the Court of Justice has followed suit with a
strong emphasis on the importance of governmental transparency
and, hence, accountability in its interpretation of Article 190.12
The ECJ has been more hesitant about imposing dialogue requirements, although Shapiro detects hints in that direction."3
If we assume judicial sensitivity to the democracy deficit, we
might expect this emphasis on transparency to continue and the
tentative steps toward increasing "dialogue" or participation requirements to accelerate. We would not expect, however, the ECJ
to follow their U.S. brethren toward full-fledged substantive review, in which the giving reasons requirement becomes a giving
good reasons requirement and, ultimately, a requirement that the
administrator prove that she chose the best of several possible reasoned outcomes. 4 In a Community under suspicion for bypassing
normal national democratic modes of governance, the judges of the
ECJ would do better to enhance the accountability of Community
actions and open the doors to full participation by national groups,
but then to pull back and accept the political bargain struck.

o Article 190 of the EEC Treaty provides, in relevant part: "Regulations, directives and

decisions" of the Council and of the Commission "shall state the reasons on which they are
based." Article 173 of the EEC Treaty requires all Community actions to satisfy "essential
procedural requirements," a requirement that the ECJ has held extends to the giving reasons requirement.
"

Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U Chi Legal F 179, 180, 188,

204-05.
" Id at 200-201. Bieber similarly discusses the importance of transparency ("publicity") with respect to the European Parliament's legislative process. Bieber, 46 Aussenwirtschaft at 403 (cited in note 2).
" Shapiro, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 205. (cited in note 11).
" Id at 186. Shapiro calls these maximum giving reasons and participation requirements "synoptic decisionmaking."

JUDICIAL REVIEW
II.

PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN POLITY

Moving from the level of tactics to strategy, from the details of
the ECJ's administrative jurisprudence to broad principles of interpretation, enhanced democracy in the Community might seem
to entail a general, posture of judicial restraint. Hjalte Rasmussen
clearly draws this inference, although his analysis focuses more on
the specific problem of maintaining judicial legitimacy and authority than on a larger Community-wide crisis of democratic legitimacy. The leading critic of the ECJ's rampant "judicial activism"
in forging the Community legal system, 5 Rasmussen now beseeches the ECJ to step back from its insistence on "an ever closer
union" and focus instead on promoting the narrower values of legal
security and certainty for individual Community citizens. 6 Such
values are the hallmark of the rule of law that the ECJ is bound to
observe in interpreting and applying the Treaty.1 7 Overall, Rasmussen argues a reformulation of EC-judicial jurisprudential policy must inescapably have self-restraint as its leitmotif.8

A version of this argument specifically designed to address the
democracy deficit would emphasize the relationship between the
relative activism of the ECJ and the activity level of the Community political organs. As Rasmussen points out, the necessity of
countering the dormancy and stagnation of the political processes
of integration provides the ECJ's preferred justification in handing
down its landmark constitutional decisions. Conversely, once the
political institutions resume a more active role, the ECJ can return
to the less dramatic and controversial business of resolving the disputes before it. 9 In a word, the peoples of the Community face the
prospect of integration by judicial fiat only when the judiciary is
the only force pushing for integration. As the political representatives become active, the ECJ becomes progressively more restrained, ensuring that major initiatives are taken only by agents
that are directly politically accountable.

"
Rasmussen forcefully makes this case in his major work to date. See Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986).
11 Hjalte Rasmussen, Towards a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Community
Law, 1992 U Chi Legal F 135, 159-62, 175-78.
"7 See EEC, Art 164.
"8Rasmussen, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 175-78.
'9 In the words of Judge Mancini, commenting on precisely this phenomenon with respect to the ECJ, "When democracy advances and politics asserts its claims, judges are
bound to take a pace back." G. Frederico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 Common Mkt L Rev 595, 613 (1989).
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To see judicial restraint as an answer to a lack of political democracy accepts the conventional wisdom about the democracy
deficit: that the populations of Member States fear unauthorized
encroachment on their rights by unaccountable Community institutions. If, however, Weiler is correct in his assessment that the
deeper problem is fear of loss of control not over the Commission
or the ECJ, but over coalitions of other Member States under a
system of qualified majority voting, then a bolder affirmative judicial strategy emerges.
A vital function of a judiciary in a liberal democracy is the
protection of minority rights. This floor of minimum protections
provides the foundation for minority acceptance of majority decisions. 2 In a process of political expansion that threatens to transform old majorities into new minorities, a strong supranational
court may temporarily be able to perform the political role being
ceded, at least in part, by national legislatures. In other words, the
European Court of Justice could provide some assurances that if
the Danes (or the British, the Belgians, or the Italians) must become a minority, they will not be subject to the untrammelled
whim of a new majority.
One way for the ECJ to play this role is to follow recommendations that the court shift its human rights jurisprudence to focus
on safeguarding the rights of individual EC citizens against the exercise of power by Community organs.21 The ECJ has created a
.Community charter of human rights, "inspired by" but not derived
from the constitutional traditions of Member States and international treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
Although nominally a check on the exercise of Community power,
the creation and evolution of this charter was in fact a largely jurisdictional gambit designed to preserve the power of the ECJ to
'0 See, for example, Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist
Papers 469-470 (Mentor, 1961); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 29-31 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). Weiler has already
pointed out ways in which the standard "counter-majoritarian" fears about the judiciary do
not apply so readily to the Community context, observing that a "gouvernement des juges"
is less worrisome when juxtaposed not against a government of democratically elected representatives, but rather against an equally unelected "gouvernement des fonctionnaires." Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust, 61 Wash L Rev 1103, 1116-17 (1986). The argument advanced here goes one step farther and suggests a new role for courts during a
process of democratic transition. See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, The European Court at a
Crossroads: Community Human Rights and Member State Action, in Capotorti et. al., eds.,
Du droit international au droit de l'integration: Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore 821
(1987).
2
This is a consistent theme in Rasmussen's work.
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forge and apply a uniform body of Community law.2 2 Human
rights review bolstered the ECJ against rebellious national courts
claiming the necessity and exclusive power to review claims that
Community actions violated the human rights provisions in their
national constitutions. Notwithstanding these initial motives, however, the potential exists for the ECJ to check the integration process sufficiently to protect the minimum rights of Community citizens finding their feet in a larger polity. Within this larger
framework, the Rasmussen emphasis on legal security and certainty becomes part of a general "strategy of reassurance"
designed to convince Community citizens that the shift from the
national to the supranational planes does not deprive them of
traditional procedural and substantive safeguards against the exercise of government power.
An even more powerful way for the ECJ to help alleviate the
democracy deficit, albeit one that would require a major change in
current judicial attitudes and political understandings, is for the
court to safeguard the current lines of division between Member
State governments and Community organs as a means of ensuring
zones of autonomy for the component parts of a newly emerging
whole. This proposition represents a complete reversal of the traditional judicial view that integration has seemed to require a continual encroachment on the jurisdictional preserves of the Member
States-a process that Weiler has described as "jurisdictional mutation."2 3 If the greatest danger facing integration beyond 1992 is
indeed the fear of such encroachments as territorial boundaries
gradually give way, then the most constructive role for the ECJ is
the protection not of individual citizens' rights against government, but of their collective decisionmaking abilities as government. In this reconceptualization of European political space, the
European nations represent the minorities needing at least temporary protection to ensure the stability and legitimacy of majority
rule.
This approach raises three immediate objections. First, what if
the large majority of Community Member States actually favor integration? The approach assumes that Weiler's diagnosis is, in

22

This claim is a theme of Weiler's analysis of the ECJ's human rights jurisprudence in

Eurocracy and Distrust, 61 Wash L Rev at 1118-20 (cited in note 20). He also presciently
pointed out that the ECJ faced a credibility gap if it proved unwilling to apply any provisions of its metaphysical human rights charter against Community organs in any way that
might temporarily check the integration process. Id at 1119.
" Weiler, 100 Yale L J at 2437-50 (cited in note 5).
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fact, correct: that Denmark is not an outlier; that even if the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, substantial minorities in each of the Member States will be audibly uneasy about ceding national sovereignty
to Brussels.
Second, how would the ECJ implement such an approach
without being blatantly political, openly putting a thumb on the
Member States' side of the scale? The answer here is that the implementation of this approach would simply require the adoption
of a new principle of interpretation in all cases involving a choice
of competences between the Community and the Member States.
All the cases that Weiler describes as instances of "jurisdictional
mutation" the ECJ could now read in light of the Maastricht
Treaty's emphasis on subsidiarity and democracy. Such a reading
would indicate that unless the Treaty directly and explicitly provides for Community competence, competence must remain with
the Member States.24 Judge Koen Lenaerts of the European Court
of First Instance similarly describes the ECJ as having acted as a
"catalyst" of integration.2" Where once the court, in his account,
extended Community jurisdiction over a particular area such as
environmental or educational policy, thereby confronting the
Member States with the choice of taking action themselves on the
Community level or facing "creeping legislation" by the ECJ, 26 or

where once it changed the baseline assumptions underlying the
Community harmonization process from no recognition of foreign
technical standards until harmonization to recognition of all "functionally equivalent" technical restrictions, 27 now the ECJ would either wait for unequivocal jurisdictional signals from the political
branches or give weight to existing baselines as evidence of the
shared conceptions underlying existing political bargains. These
are indeed specific instances of judicial restraint, but targeted restraint with a specific rationale.
The third objection asks whether the ECJ could shift ground
during a "transitional" period to a larger Community polity without permanently forgoing its ability to play an overtly integrationist role. Even more concretely, can it realistically be persuaded to
take such an apparently counter-intuitive tack? It is, after all, the
" Judge Lenaerts makes a similar point about the justiciability of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty. Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts about the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 1992 U Chi Legal F 93, 133.
" Id at 132.
" Id at 110-11.
27

Id.
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court of the Community. As to the first part of this question, many
of the ECJ's judges have described their legal philosophy in terms
explicitly connected to a broader political context, explicitly justifying their relatively "activist" stance with reference to the relative
stagnation of the Community's political decisionmaking process.
Such considerations cannot be written into the opinions themselves, but the ECJ and its academic oracles can continue to explain those opinions in ways that provide for a coherent and predictable case law once broad external political conditions and
historical trends are taken into account. Could the current court be
persuaded to shift course? Perhaps, if they could be persuaded
that the goal-an ever closer Union-remains the same, but that
changing circumstances dictate different means to achieve it. The
ECJ itself would provide the political equivalent of a new Luxembourg Compromise, but the overall political balance necessary to
legitimate the Community-this time as an emerging democratic
polity-would be preserved. 8
If the ECJ were simultaneously to adopt this approach and to
move in the direction predicted by Martin Shapiro on the administrative front, the court would effectively combine the traditional
liberal democratic emphasis on the protection of minority rights
with the pluralist political theory of the 1950s, emphasizing the
importance of minority group access to the political process.
Against the overall backdrop of a sea change in the territorial
boundaries of the "polity," a strategy of incremental change and
habituation would simultaneously reassure members of national
populations whose interests are best promoted in the national (local) political environment while offering incentives to those groups
who benefit from transnational coalitions. Creating opportunities
for maximum direct participation by these interest groups in the
Community decisionmaking process could help facilitate the transfer of national loyalties while maintaining temporary safeguards
for those left unpersuaded.

Although theoretically neat, the next question is whether such a strategy would be
preferable to a more neutral policy of judicial restraint, simply throwing the ball back to the
political branches whenever possible. The arguments for sailing on a very different tack in
favor of the Member States are that a situation of qualified majority voting will not assuage
the fears of Member States in the political arena; further, the ECJ arguably needs to take
more dramatic action to salvage its own reputation (and protect its future) in a number of
Member States.
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THE COURT AS "IDEA-GIVER"

From tactics to strategy to norms. Judge Lenaerts heartily endorses the prescriptions concerning a new judicial emphasis on
checks and balances within the Community decision-making process, an increased focus on protecting individual rights against
Community excesses of power, and "judicial protection of the interests of private parties against illegal administrative acts of Community institutions. '2 9 He claims further that the ECJ has already
put many of these ideas into action, based on "the fundamental
awareness that the Treaties serve as the constitution of a Community based on the rule of law."3 0 Unlike Rasmussen, however,
Lenaerts argues that because the political institutions of the Community are as committed to the rule of law as the ECJ itself, the
court has "kept the confidence" of Community political institutions and often nudged them forward.3 1 Advancing a version of this
argument in the language of rational choice analysis, several political scientists have recently argued that the ECJ can provide focal
points for multiple political equilibria, breaking logjams and permitting a political consensus to form.2 Simply stated, this proposition views the ECJ as an "idea-giver," generating creative
solutions.
Lawyers are also accustomed to thinking of courts as idea generators, but perhaps in less instrumental and pragmatic terms.
Many of the "ideas" courts generate are moral ideas-in Alexander
Bickel's phrase: "the enduring values of a society." 33 On this oldfashioned plane of analysis, the ECJ might also be expected to
function as "norm-giver"-norms that resonate with the deepest
values of its hearers, reminding them of their aspirations as well as
their shortcomings. As conscience of the Community, rather than
catalyst or referee, the ECJ could respond to the democracy deficit

29

Lenaerts, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 131 (cited in note 24).

30 Id at 132.
31 Id.
31 See Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Con-

structing the EC's Internal Market (Paper presented at NBER Conference on Political Economics, Oct 1991).
33 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 25-26 (cited in note 20).
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by adopting a new telos for its famed teleological method of interpretation. For the 1990s, and beyond, the goal must be "an ever
closer democratic union."3 s

" Case 294/83, Partie ecologiste 'Les Verts' v European Parliament, 1986 ECR 1339,
1987:2 CMLR 343. In Les Verts, the ECJ explicitly overrode an apparent political consensus
of the Member States against granting the Parliament status as defendant in cases charging
Community organs with ultra vires action under Article 173, referring directly to the importance of the democratic principle in the Community. 1986 ECR 1-39.
The ECJ has also defended democratic principles in cases involving the institutional
role of the Parliament. See Case 138/79, SA Roquette Frgres v Council, 1980 ECR 3333, and
Case 139/79, Maizena GmbH v Council, 1980 ECR 3393 (legislation is void if the Council
ignores the requirement that the Parliament first give its opinion); and Case C-70/88, Re
Radioactive Food: European Parliament v Council, 1990 ECR 2067, 1992:1 CMLR 91 (absence of treaty provision granting Parliament a rightto bring actions for annulment "cannot
prevail over the fundamental interest in the maintenance and observance of the institutional balance" of the Community).
The ECJ has also worked to preserve democracy within the Community institutions
themselves. See Case 54/75, De Dapper v European Parliament, 1976 ECR 1381, 1389
(Community institutions, -and through them the ECJ, have a duty to ensure that Community staff "have complete freedom to choose their representatives in accordance with democratic rules").

